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I. The Parties
Nationale Loterij NV (‘NL’) was founded in 1934 and organises public lotteries in Belgium ever
since. [1] NL holds a legal monopoly on this market [2]. In addition, NL competes with other
companies on the Belgian sports betting market.
Stanleybet Belgium NV, Stanley International Betting Ltd., Savegas S.A., World Football Association
S.P.R.L and Samenwerkende Nevenmaatschappij Belgische PMU S.C.R.L. (‘Stanleybet et al.’) are
NL’s competitors on the Belgian sports betting market.
II. The Facts
From 2013 onwards NL extended its gambling services to sports betting under the name Scooore!.
NL distributes Scooore! via physical channels, such as press shops(offline) and digital channels
(online). Soon after the launch of Scooore!, Stanleybet et al. lodged a complaint with the Belgian
Competition Authority (‘BCA’) with regard to NL’s actions during the launch of Scooore! . In two
decisions - rendered on the same day - the BCA dismissed most of the complaints, except two
(regarding the cross-use of customers’ data and a survey concerning its competitors; see infra). NL
settled for 1,190,000 EUR. This was the BCA’s first application of the Belgian settlement procedure
for an abuse of dominance, a procedure that does not exist on EU level.
III. The Decisions
Relevant markets. The BCA finds that two distinct markets have to be taken into account. Firstly,
the market of public lotteries in Belgium, which is considered as ‘a market on its own.’ [3] As NL
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holds a legal monopoly on this market it is considered to have a dominant position. Secondly, the
Belgian sports betting market is scrutinized. A distinction is made between the physical and the
non-physical distribution of sports betting [4] . With regard to the former a sub-distinction is made
between the distribution of sports betting via betting offices and distribution via press shops. The
BCA concludes that NL’s allegedly abusive conduct is related to the offer of sports betting via
physical distributors. However, a formal market definition is not given by the BCA with regards to
the offer of sports betting.
A dominant position and a neighbouring market. As a preliminary point, the BCA holds that it is
not forbidden for an undertaking holding a monopoly on one market to expand its business to other
activities. However, the BCA warns that such a diversification must be scrutinized thoroughly as the
incumbent undertaking (in casu NL) could use advantages obtained under its legal monopoly (in
casu on the market for public lotteries) to enter a competitive market (in casu the sports betting
market) under more favourable conditions than its competitors. With a rather general reference to
TeliaSonera [5] the BCA considers that Article 102 TFEU [6] can be applied in specific
circumstances to such a case and that it is able to sanction conduct on a non-dominated market that
is neighbouring a dominated one, when this conduct has effects on the non-dominated market.
Complaint. Stanleybet et al. complained about several actions undertaken by NL in support of the
launch of Scooore! . We will limit ourselves to the discussion of the most interesting allegations [7].
The cross-use of distributors’ data. It was argued that NL, while entering the sports betting
market, cross-used data which it obtained in the context of its legal monopoly. Firstly, NL invited
some of the best-selling press shops in order to present Scooore! to them. The complainants argued
that the selection of those shops was made by using data NL obtained in the context of its legal
monopoly. The BCA dismissed this complaint.
The BCA acknowledges that this selection was made on the basis of non-public information (the
average weekly turnover of lottery products), but held (i) that without the use of these data NL
would presumably have invited all press shops. Next to that, (ii) the BCA holds that the use of
non-public data by a dominant undertaking may constitute an abuse only when (ii.a) the data is
obtained outside the context of competition on the merits; and (ii.b) when these data is
non-reproducible by competitors against reasonable financial conditions and within a reasonable
period. The BCA holds that condition ii.b is not fulfilled and as a consequence that no abuse is
present. Competitors could use other criteria (such as the location of the press shops) to make an
equivalent selection of press shops, against reasonable financial conditions and within a reasonable
period.
The cross-use of customers’ data. The BCA came to a different conclusion regarding the second
type of conduct that is criticised by Stanleybet et al. NL sent, prior to the launch of Scooore! , a
single impersonalised e-mail to many of its lottery customers, whose personal data was stored in an
Interactive Gaming System database (‘the IGS database’), in order to promote Scooore!  [8]. The
BCA applied the same test as described above. It held that the IGS database was (i) obtained in the
context of a monopoly and (ii) that it is non-reproducible by competitors against reasonable financial
conditions and within a reasonable period, taking into account the nature and the scope of the
database.
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In the eyes of the BCA such a practice may constitute an abuse of dominance when it has a
competition distorting effect on the market. The demonstration of a potential competition distorting
effect, by which competitors that are as-efficient could be foreclosed is sufficient. The BCA
concludes that such potential effect is present. It holds that even though NL only has a market share
of 15-20% on the sports betting market one year after Scooore!’s launch, this finding should be put
in perspective as various other sports betting license holders have even smaller market shares. It
holds that as those smaller undertakings do not have the same brand awareness, nor the same
financial means as NL [9], there is a risk of market foreclosure or marginalisation of those
undertakings, or at least the competition between NL and its competitors could be distorted on the
sports betting market.
Cross-subsidisation. The complainants held that NL cross-subsidized and used tangible means
(promo material, etc.) and intangible means (use of the same platform for lotteries and sports
betting, etc.) stemming from its monopoly activity to promote Scooore!. The BCA refers to the Court
of First Instance’s UFEX judgment and the Commission’s Guidelines on art. 102 TFEU [10] to hold
that cross-subsidisation is not abusive as such. Only when cross-subsidies are used to apply
predatory prices in the non-dominated market or when commercial practices are applied that lead to
a sustainable distortion of that market, which wouldn’t have occurred without the subsidies, an
abuse is present. The BCA holds that NL has separate accounts for both the public lotteries and the
sports betting activities, while reserving a considerable compensation for the use of some means
stemming from its monopoly activities. It also hints towards the absence of predatory pricing.
Therefore, the BCA judged that it is unlikely to find an abuse. The BCA decided not to perform an
in-depth investigation.
NL’s survey concerning its competitors. In 2011 NL organised a survey among its physical
distributors in an attempt to observe the sports betting market conditions. Turnover figures and
commission fees of sports betting organisers were demanded (not all requests were answered). After
the launch of Scooore! additional requests were sent on an occasional basis. The BCA holds that by
obtaining this information NL had decreased the uncertainty about its competitors conduct and
therefore potentially distorted competition. The BCA also notes that it cannot be excluded that
absent the gathering of this sensitive information NL might have offered its products on better terms.
Consequently, this conduct is qualified as an abuse of dominance.
IV. Comments
The decisions are interesting as they deal with the question by which means a legal monopolist is
allowed to expand its activities into competitive neighbouring markets.
It is notable that, on the one hand, NL is allowed to cross-use data it has on its distributors (public
lottery turnover), as its competitors have the possibility to use other criteria to obtain an equivalent
result. While, on the other hand, it is not allowed to cross-use the database it has on customers, as
this database is considered not to be reasonably reproducible by its competitors. One can question
this finding and wonder which concrete benchmark was applied to come to this conclusion.
We are looking forward to subsequent cases following on this decision. Especially regarding the use
of (big) data by dominant firms as some questions still remain unanswered. A key question will be
whether the BCA considers the mere cross-use of databases - obtained outside the context of
This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to
3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L 335-2 CPI). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 CPI and DRM protection.
Simon Troch, Rik  Callens | e-Competitions | N° 79726 Page 3/5www.concurrences.com
competition on the merits (which is on itself a vague concept) - by a dominant undertaking as
abusive if an as efficient competitor cannot reproduce the concerned database against reasonable
financial conditions and in a reasonable time (unclear practical implementation of this benchmark)?
Or does it consider only the cross-use of legal monopolistic databases to be abusive?
[1] NL distributes, for example, the products Euromillions and Lotto in Belgium.
[2] In exchange for this monopoly NL pays an annual ‘monopoly rent’ to the Belgian State. An
agreement concerning the activities and the tasks of NL is closed every five years between NL and
the Belgian State.
[3] Reference is made to Decision n° 00-D-50 (5 March 2001) of the French Competition Authority
which states: “pure games of chance that are offered on the public lotteries market are not
substitutable with partially controllable games of chance (like horse betting), nor with pure games of
chance offered in casino’s, as these have a limited geographical availability” (adaptation and
translation by the author).
[4] The BCA elaborates on the difference between physical distribution and non-physical distribution
(internet based distribution). It states that the “presentation of the possible bets, the navigation and
the interactivity offered by the internet enables players to choose faster and easier the events and
the type of betting game on which they want to make bets” (translation by the author.) Another
difference is that internet based bets can be made 24/7 whereas bets made in a physical distribution
center depend on the opening hours of the these facilities. A sociological component is also briefly
discussed: online bets are mainly placed by younger players, who are mostly men and which mostly
have an urban profile.
[5] CJEU, 17 February 2011, Case C-52/09, TeliaSoneira Sverige, para. 85-86.
[6] Art. IV.2 of the Belgian Code of Economic Law is equivalent to art. 102 TFEU.
[7] Apart from the ones we’ll discuss, it is inter alia argued that NL needlessly held two sports
betting licenses, thereby foreclosing a potential new competitor, as the Belgian legislation provides
for a quotum of 34 sports betting licenses that may be granted (dismissed). It was also argued,
under art. 101 TFEU / art. IV.1§1 of the Belgian Code of Economic Law that NL encouraged press
shops to close agreements with NL containing exclusivity and non-compete clauses (dismissed). In
addition, Stanleybet et al. complained about the fact that NL used its brand awareness and image
(gained in the context of its legal monopoly) to support the launch and marketing of Scooore! on the
competitive sports betting market (dismissed - complainants were already present on the Belgian
sports betting market for a long time, with increasing success, and well-known themselves).
[8] The e-mail was sent to persons with a subscription on the NL’s newsletter (due to technical
problems not all persons were reached). The database contains names, addresses, date of birth, sex,
... For some customers even information regarding the amount of money put on their gambling
account, the type of gambling games played, the playing habits etc.
[9] The BCA uses the odd wording ‘NL or other big international players’ - so this other big
international players would not be foreclosed?.
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[10] Court of First Instance, 7 June 2006, Case T-613/97, Union française de l’express (UFEX), DHL
International SA, Federal express international (France) SNC and CRIE SA v Commission;
Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C
45 of 24.2.2009, 7.
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